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ABSTRACT
Shared autonomy integrates user input with robot auton-
omy in order to control a robot and help the user to com-
plete a task. Our work aims to improve the performance
of such a human-robot team: the robot tries to guide the
human towards an effective strategy, sometimes against the
human’s own preference, while still retaining his trust. We
achieve this through a principled human-robot mutual adap-
tation formalism. We integrate a bounded-memory adapta-
tion model of the human into a partially observable stochas-
tic decision model, which enables the robot to adapt to an
adaptable human. When the human is adaptable, the robot
guides the human towards a good strategy, maybe unknown
to the human in advance. When the human is stubborn and
not adaptable, the robot complies with the human’s prefer-
ence in order to retain their trust. In the shared autonomy
setting, unlike many other common human-robot collabora-
tion settings, only the robot actions can change the physical
state of the world, and the human and robot goals are not
fully observable. We address these challenges and show in a
human subject experiment that the proposed mutual adap-
tation formalism improves human-robot team performance,
while retaining a high level of user trust in the robot, com-
pared to the common approach of having the robot strictly
following participants’ preference.
1. INTRODUCTION
Assistive robot arms show great promise in increasing the
independence of people with upper extremity disabilities [1–
3]. However, when a user teleoperates directly a robotic
arm via an interface such as a joystick, the limitation of
the interface, combined with the increased capability and
complexity of robot arms, often makes it difficult or tedious
to accomplish complex tasks.
Shared autonomy alleviates this issue by combining direct
teleoperation with autonomous assistance [4–8]. In recent
work by Javdani et al., the robot estimates a distribution of
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Figure 1: Table clearing task in a shared autonomy setting.
The user operates the robot using a joystick interface and
moves the robot towards the left bottle, which is a subopti-
mal goal. The robot plans its actions based on its estimate of
the current human goal and the probability α of the human
switching towards a new goal indicated by the robot.
user goals based on the history of user inputs, and assists
the user for that distribution [9]. The user is assumed to be
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Figure 2: The user guides the robot towards an unstable grasp, resulting in task failure.
always right about their goal choice. Therefore, if the as-
sistance strategy knows the user’s goal, it will select actions
to minimize the cost-to-go to that goal. This assumption is
often not true, however. For instance, a user may choose an
unstable grasp when picking up an object (Fig. 2), or they
may arrange items in the wrong order by stacking a heavy
item on top of a fragile one. Fig. 1 shows a shared autonomy
scenario, where the user teleoperates the robot towards the
left bottle. We assume that the robot knows the optimal goal
for the task : picking up the right bottle is a better choice, for
instance because the left bottle is too heavy, or because the
robot has less uncertainty about the right bottle’s location.
Intuitively, if the human insists on the left bottle, the robot
should comply; failing to do so can have a negative effect on
the user’s trust in the robot, which may lead to disuse of the
system [10–12]. If the human is willing to adapt by align-
ing its actions with the robot, which has been observed in
adaptation between humans and artifacts [13,14], the robot
should insist towards the optimal goal. The human-robot
team then exhibits a mutually adaptive behavior, where the
robot adapts its own actions by reasoning over the adaptabil-
ity of the human teammate.
Nikolaidis et al. [15] proposed a mutual adaptation for-
malism in collaborative tasks, e.g., when a human and a
robot work together to carry a table out of the room. The
robot builds a Bounded-memory Adaptation Model (BAM)
of the human teammate, and it integrates the model into a
partially observable stochastic process, which enables robot
adaptation to the human: If the user is adaptable, the robot
will disagree with them, expecting them to switch towards
the optimal goal. Otherwise, the robot will align its actions
with the user policy, thus retaining their trust.
A characteristic of many collaborative settings is that hu-
man and robot both affect the world state, and that dis-
agreement between the human and the robot impedes task
completion. For instance, in the table-carrying example, if
human and robot attempt to move the table in opposing
directions with equal force, the table will not move and the
task will not progress. Therefore, a robot that optimizes the
task completion time will account for the human adaptabil-
ity implicitly in its optimization process: if the human is
non-adaptable, the only way for the robot to complete the
task is to follow the human goal. This is not the case in
a shared-autonomy setting, since the human actions do not
affect the state of the task. Therefore, a robot that solely
maximizes task performance in that setting will always move
towards the optimal goal, ignoring human inputs altogether.
In this work, we propose a generalized human-robot mu-
tual adaptation formalism, and we formulate mutual adap-
tation in the collaboration and shared-autonomy settings as
instances of this formalism.
We identify that in the shared-autonomy setting (1) tasks
may typically exhibit less structure than in the collabora-
tion domain, which limits the observability of the user’s in-
tent, and (2) only robot actions directly affect task progress.
We address the first challenge by including the operator
goal as an additional latent variable in a mixed-observability
Markov decision process (MOMDP) [16]. This allows the
robot to maintain a probability distribution over the user
goals based on the history of operator inputs. We also take
into account the uncertainty that the human has on the
robot goal by modeling the human as having a probabil-
ity distribution over the robot goals (Sec. 3). We address
the second challenge by proposing an explicit penalty for
disagreement in the reward function that the robot is max-
imizing (Sec. 4). This allows the robot to infer simultane-
ously the human goal and the human adaptability, reason
over how likely the human is to switch their goal based on
the robot actions, and guide the human towards the optimal
goal while retaining their trust.
We conducted a human subject experiment (n = 51) with
an assistive robotic arm on a table-clearing task. Results
show that the proposed formalism significantly improved
human-robot team performance, compared to the robot fol-
lowing participants’ preference, while retaining a high level
of human trust in the robot.
2. PROBLEM SETTING
A human-robot team can be treated as a multi-agent sys-
tem, with world state xworld ∈ Xworld, robot action ar ∈ Ar,
and human action ah ∈ Ah. The system evolves according to
a stochastic state transition function T : Xworld×Ar×Ah →
Π(Xworld). Additionally, we model the user as having a goal,
among a discrete set of goals g ∈ G. We assume access to a
stochastic joint policy for each goal, which we call modal pol-
icy, or mode m ∈M . We call mh the modal policy that the
human is following at a given time-step, and mr the robot
mode, which is the [perceived by the human] robot policy
towards a goal. The human mode, mh ∈M is not fully ob-
servable. Instead, the robot has uncertainty over the user’s
policy, that can modeled as a Partially Observable Markov
Decision Process (POMDP). Observations in the POMDP
correspond to human actions ah ∈ Ah. Given a sequence
of human inputs, we infer a distribution over user modal
policies using an observation function O(ah|xworld,mh).
Contrary to previous work in modeling human intention [17]
and in shared autonomy [9], the user goal is not static.
Instead, we define a transition function Tmh : M × Ht ×
Xworld×Ar → Π(M), where ht is the history of states, robot
and human actions
(
x0world, a
0
r, a
0
h, . . . , x
t−1
world, a
t−1
r , a
t−1
h
)
. The
function models how the human mode may change over time.
At each time step, the human-robot team receives a real-
valued reward that in the general case also depends on the
human mode mh and history ht: R(mh, ht, xworld, ar, ah).
The reward captures both the relative cost of each goal
g ∈ G, as well as the cost of disagreement between the hu-
man and the robot. The robot goal is then to maximize the
expected total reward over time:
∑∞
t=0 γ
tR(t), where the
discount factor γ ∈ [ 0, 1) gives higher weight to immediate
rewards than future ones.
Computing the maximization is hard: Both Tmh and R
depend on the whole history of states, robot and human ac-
tions ht. We use the Bounded-memory Adaptation Model [15]
to simplify the problem.
2.1 Bounded-Memory Adaptation Model
Nikolaidis et al. [15] proposed the Bounded-memory Adap-
tation Model (BAM). The model is based on the assump-
tion of “bounded rationality” was proposed first by Herbert
Simon: people often do not have the time and cognitive ca-
pabilities to make perfectly rational decisions [18]. In game
theory, bounded rationality has been modeled by assuming
that players have a “bounded memory” or “bounded recall”
and base their decisions on recent observations [19–21].
The BAM model allows us to simplify the problem, by
modeling the human as making decisions not on the whole
history of interactions, but on the last k interactions with the
robot. This allows us to simplify the transition function Tmh
and reward function R defined in the previous section, so
that they depend on the history of the last k time-steps only.
Additionally, BAM provides a parameterization of the tran-
sition function Tmh , based on the parameter α ∈ A, which
is the human adaptability. The adaptability represents one’s
inclination to adapt to the robot. With the BAM assump-
tions, we have Tmh : M × A × Hk × Xworld × Ar → Π(M)
and R : M ×Hk ×Xworld ×Ar ×Ah → R. We describe the
implementation of Tmh in Sec. 3 and of R in Sec. 4.
2.2 Shared Autonomy
The shared autonomy setting allows us to further simplify
the general problem: the world state consists only of the
robot configuration xr ∈ Xr, so that xr ≡ xworld. A robot
action induces a deterministic change in the robot configu-
ration. The human actions ah ∈ Ah are inputs through a
joystick interface and do not affect the world state. There-
fore, the transition function of the system is deterministic
and can be defined as: T : Xr ×Ar → Xr.
2.3 Collaboration
We include the collaboration setting formalism for com-
pleteness. Contrary to the shared-autonomy setting, both
human and robot actions affect the world state, and the
transition function can be deterministic or stochastic. In
the deterministic case, it is T : Xworld×Ar ×Ah → Xworld.
Additionally, the reward function does not require a penalty
for disagreement between the human and robot modes; in-
stead, it can depend only on the relative cost for each goal,
so that R : Xworld → R. Finally, if the task exhibits consid-
erable structure, the modes may be directly observed from
the human and robot actions. In that case, the robot does
not maintain a distribution over modal policies.
3. HUMANANDROBOTMODE INFERENCE
When the human provides an input through a joystick in-
terface, the robot makes an inference on the human mode. In
GL GR
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Figure 3: (left) Paths corresponding to three different modal
policies that lead to the same goal GL. We use a stochastic
modal policy mL to compactly represent all feasible paths
from S to GL. (right) The robot moving upwards from point
S could be moving towards either GL or GR.
the example table-clearing task of Fig. 1, if the robot moves
to the right, the human will infer that the robot follows a
modal policy towards the right bottle. Similarly, if the hu-
man moves the joystick to the left, the robot will consider
more likely that the human follows a modal policy towards
the left bottle. In this section, we formalize the inference
that human and robot make on each other’s goals.
3.1 Stochastic Modal Policies
In the shared autonomy setting, there can be a very large
number of modal policies that lead to the same goal. We
use as example the table-clearing task of Fig. 1. We let
GL represent the left bottle, GR the right bottle, and S
the starting end-effector position of the robot. Fig. 3-left
shows paths from three different modal policies that lead to
the same goal GL. Accounting for a large set of modes can
increase the computational cost, in particular if we assume
that the human mode is partially observable (Section 5).
Therefore, we define a modal policy as a stochastic joint-
policy over human and robot actions, so that m : Xr×Ht →
Π(Ar)×Π(Ah). A stochastic modal policy compactly repre-
sents a probability distribution over paths and allows us to
reason probabilistically about the future actions of an agent
that does not move in a perfectly predictable manner. For
instance, we can use the principle of maximum entropy to
create a probability distribution over all paths from start to
the goal [22,23]. While a stochastic modal policy represents
the uncertainty of the observer over paths, we do not require
the agent to actually follow a stochastic policy.
3.2 Full Observability Assumption
While mr, mh can be assumed to be observable for a vari-
ety of structured tasks in the collaboration domain [15], this
is not the case for the shared autonomy setting because of
the following factors:
Different policies invoke the same action. Assume two
modal policies in Fig. 3, one for the left goal shown in red
in Fig. 3-left, and a symmetric policy for the right goal (not
shown). An agent moving upwards (Figure 3-right) could
be following either of the two with equal probability. In
that case, inference of the exact modal policy without any
prior information is impossible, and the observer needs to
maintain a uniform belief over the two policies.
Human inputs are noisy. The user provides its inputs
to the system through a joystick interface. These inputs are
noisy: the user may “overshoot” an intended path and cor-
rect their input, or move the joystick in the wrong direction.
In the fully observable case, this would result in an incor-
rect inference of the human mode. Maintaining a belief over
modal policies allows robustness to human mistakes.
This leads us to assume that modal policies are partially
observable. We model how the human infers the robot mode,
as well as how the robot infers the human mode, in the
following sections.
3.3 Robot Mode Inference
The bounded-memory assumption dictates that the hu-
man does not recall the whole history of states and actions,
but only a recent history of the last k time-steps. The hu-
man attributes the robot actions to a robot mode mr.
P (mr|hk, xtr, atr) = P (mr|xt−k+1r , at−k+1r , ..., xtr, atr)
= η P (at−k+1r , ..., a
t
r|mr, xt−k+1r , ..., xtr)
(1)
In this work, we consider modal policies that generate
actions based only on the current world state, so that M :
Xr → Π(Ah)×Π(Ar).
Therefore Eq. 1 can be simplified as follows, wheremr(x
t
r, a
t
r)
denotes the probability of the robot taking action ar at time
t, if it follows modal policy mr:
P (mr|hk, xtr, atr) = η mr(xt−k+1r , at−k+1r )...mr(xtr, atr) (2)
P (mr|hk, xtr, atr) is the [estimated by the robot] human
belief on the robot mode mr.
3.4 Human Mode Inference
To infer the human mode, we need to implement the dy-
namics model Tmh that describes how the human mode
evolves over time, and the observation function O that al-
lows the robot to update its belief on the human mode from
the human actions.
In Sec. 2 we defined a transition function Tmh , that indi-
cates the probability of the human switching from mode mh
to a new mode m′h, given a history hk and their adaptability
α. We simplify the notation, so that xr ≡ xtr, ar ≡ atr and
x ≡ (hk, xr):
Tmh(x, α,mh, ar,m
′
h) = P (m
′
h|x, α,mh, ar)
=
∑
mr
P (m′h,mr|x, α,mh, ar)
=
∑
mr
P (m′h|x, α,mh, ar,mr)× P (mr|x, α,mh, ar)
=
∑
mr
P (m′h|α,mh,mr)× P (mr|x, ar)
(3)
The first term gives the probability of the human switch-
ing to a new mode m′h, if the human mode is mh and the
robot mode is mr. Based on the BAM model [15], the hu-
man switches to mr, with probability α and stays at mh
with probability 1 − α. Nikolaidis et al. [15] define α as
the human adaptability, which represents their inclination
to adapt to the robot. If α = 1, the human switches to mr
with certainty. If α = 0, the human insists on their mode
mh and does not adapt. Therefore:
P (m′h|α,mh,mr) =
 α m
′
h ≡ mr
1− α m′h ≡ mh
0 otherwise
(4)
The second term in Eq. 3 is computed using Eq. 2, and it
is the [estimated by the human] robot mode.
Eq. 3 describes that the probability of the human switch-
ing to a new robot mode mr depends on the human adapt-
ability α, as well as on the uncertainty that the human has
about the robot following mr. This allows the robot to com-
pute the probability of the human switching to the robot
mode, given each robot action.
The observation function O : Xr ×M → Π(Ah) defines a
probability distribution over human actions ah. This distri-
bution is specified by the stochastic modal policy mh ∈ M .
Given the above, the human mode mh can be estimated by
a Bayes filter, with b(mh) the robot’s previous belief on mh:
b′(m′h) =η O(m
′
h, x
′
r, ah)
∑
mh∈M
Tmh(x, α,mh, ar,m
′
h)b(mh)
(5)
In this section, we assumed that α is known to the robot.
In practice, the robot needs to estimate both mh and α. We
formulate this in Sec. 5.
4. DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN MODES
In the previous section we formalized the inference that
human and robot make on each other’s goals. Based on that,
the robot can infer the human goal and it can reason over
how likely the human is to switch goals given a robot action.
Intuitively, if the human insists on their goal, the robot
should follow the human goal, even if it is suboptimal, in
order to retain human trust. If the human is willing to
change goals, the robot should move towards the optimal
goal. We enable this behavior by proposing in the robot’s
reward function a penalty for disagreement between human
and robot modes. The intuition is that if the human is non-
adaptable, they will insist on their own mode throughout
the task, therefore the expected accumulated cost of dis-
agreeing with the human will outweigh the reward of the
optimal goal. In that case, the robot will follow the human
preference. If the human is adaptable, the robot will move
towards the optimal goal, since it will expect the human to
change modes.
We formulate the reward function that the robot is maxi-
mizing, so that there is a penalty for following a mode that
is perceived to be different than the human’s mode.
R(x,mh, ar) =
{
Rgoal : xr ∈ G
Rother : xr /∈ G (6)
If the robot is at a goal state xr ∈ G, a positive reward
associated with that goal is returned, regardless of the hu-
man mode mh and robot mode mr. Otherwise, there is a
penalty C < 0 for disagreement between mh and mr, in-
duced in Rother. The human does not observe mr directly,
but estimates it from the recent history of robot states and
actions (Sec. 3.3). Therefore, Rother is computed so that the
penalty for disagreement is weighted by the [estimated by
the human] probability of the robot actually following mr:
Rother =
∑
mr
Rm(mh,mr)P (mr|x, ar) (7)
where Rm(mh,mr) =
{
0 : mh ≡ mr
C : mh 6= mr (8)
5. HUMAN-ROBOTMUTUALADAPTATION
FORMALISM
5.1 MOMDP Formulation
In Section 3.4, we showed how the robot estimates the hu-
man mode, and how it computes the probability of the hu-
man switching to the robot mode based on the human adapt-
ability. In Section 4, we defined a reward function that the
robot is maximizing, which captures the trade-off between
going to the optimal goal and following the human mode.
Both the human adaptability and the human mode are not
directly observable. Therefore, the robot needs to estimate
them through interaction, while performing the task. This
leads us to formulate this problem as a mixed-observability
Markov Decision Process (MOMDP) [16]. This formulation
allows us to compute an optimal policy for the robot that
will maximize the expected reward that the human-robot
team will receive, given the robot’s estimates of the human
adaptability and of the human mode. We define a MOMDP
as a tuple {X,Y,Ar, Tx, Tα, Tmh , R,Ω, O}:
• X : Xr × Akr is the set of observable variables. These
are the current robot configuration xr, as well as the
history hk. Since xr transitions deterministically, we
only need to register the current robot state and robot
actions at−k+1r , ..., a
t
r.
• Y : A×M is the set of partially observable variables.
These are the human adaptability α ∈ A, and the hu-
man mode mh ∈M .
• Ar is a finite set of robot actions. We model actions
as transitions between discrete robot configurations.
• Tx : X × Ar −→ X is a deterministic mapping from a
robot configuration xr, history hk and action ar, to a
subsequent configuration x′r and history h
′
k.
• Tα : A × Ar −→ Π(A) is the probability of the hu-
man adaptability being α′ at the next time step, if the
adaptability of the human at time t is α and the robot
takes action ar. We assume the human adaptability to
be fixed throughout the task.
• Tmh : X × A ×M × Ar −→ Π(M) is the probability
of the human switching from mode mh to a new mode
m′h, given a history hk, robot state xr, human adapt-
ability α and robot action ar. It is computed using
Eq. 3, Sec. 3.4.
• R : X ×M ×Ar −→ R is a reward function that gives
an immediate reward for the robot taking action ar
given a history hk, human mode mh and robot state
xr. It is defined in Eq. 6, Sec. 4.
• Ω is the set of observations that the robot receives. An
observation is a human input ah ∈ Ah (Ω ≡ Ah).
• O : M × Xr −→ Π(Ω) is the observation function,
which gives a probability distribution over human ac-
tions for a mode mh at state xr. This distribution is
specified by the stochastic modal policy mh ∈M .
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Figure 5: Mean performance for simulated users of different
adaptability α.
5.2 Belief Update
Based on the above, the belief update for the MOMDP
is [16]:
b′(α′,m′h) = ηO(m
′
h, x
′
r, ah)
∑
α∈A
∑
mh∈M
Tx(x, ar, x′)
Tα(α, ar, α′)Tmh(x, α,mh, ar,m′h)b(α,mh)
(9)
We note that since the MOMDP has two partially ob-
servable variables, α and mh, the robot maintains a joint
probability distribution over both variables.
5.3 Robot Policy
We solve the MOMDP for a robot policy pi∗r (b) that is
optimal with respect to the robot’s expected total reward.
The stochastic modal policies may assign multiple actions
at a given state. Therefore, even if mh ≡ mr, ar may not
match the human input ah. Such disagreements are unneces-
sary when human and robot modes are the same. Therefore,
we let the robot actions match the human inputs, if the robot
has enough confidence that robot and human modes (com-
puted using Eq. 2, 5) are identical in the current time-step.
Otherwise, the robot executes the action specified by the
MOMDP optimal policy. We leave for future work adding
a penalty for disagreement between actions, which we hy-
pothesize it would result in similar behavior.
5.4 Simulations
Fig. 4 shows the robot behavior for two simulated users,
one with low adaptability (User 1, α = 0.0), and one with
high adaptability (User 2, α = 0.75) for a shared auton-
omy scenario with two goals, GL and GR, corresponding to
modal policies mL and mR respectively. Both users start
with modal policy mL (left goal). The robot uses the hu-
man input to estimate both mh and α. We set a bounded-
memory of k = 1 time-step. If human and robot disagree and
the human insists on their modal policy, then the MOMDP
belief is updated so that smaller values of adaptability α
have higher probability (lower adaptability). It the human
aligns its inputs to the robot mode, larger values become
more likely. If the robot infers the human to be adaptable,
it moves towards the optimal goal. Otherwise, it complies
with the human, thus retaining their trust.
Fig. 5 shows the team-performance over α, averaged over
1000 runs with simulated users. We evaluate performance
by the reward of the goal achieved, where Ropt is the reward
for the optimal and Rsub for the sub-optimal goal. We see
that the more adaptable the user, the more often the robot
will reach the optimal goal. Additionally, we observe that
User 1
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Figure 4: Sample runs on a shared autonomy scenario with two goals GL, GR and two simulated humans of adaptability
level α = 0 and 0.75. Both users start with modal policy mL (associated with the left goal). The human and robot actions
are {move-left, move-right, move-forward}. For both users, the upper row plots the robot trajectory (red dots), the human
input (green arrow) and the robot action (gray arrow) over time. The middle row plots the estimate of α over time, where
α ∈ {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1}. Each graph plots α versus the probability of α. The lower row plots m ∈ {mL,mR} versus the
probability of m. Columns indicate successive time-steps. User 1 insists on their initial strategy throughout the task and the
robot complies, whereas User 2 adapts to the robot and ends up following mR.
for α = 0.0, the performance is higher than Rsub. This is be-
cause the simulated user may choose to move forward in the
first time-steps; when the robot infers that they are stub-
born, it is already close to the optimal goal and continues
moving to that goal.
6. HUMAN SUBJECT EXPERIMENT
We conduct a human subject experiment (n = 51) in a
shared autonomy setting. We are interested in showing that
the human-robot mutual adaptation formalism can improve
the performance of human-robot teams, while retaining high
levels of perceived collaboration and trust in the robot in the
shared autonomy domain.
On one extreme, we “fix” the robot policy, so that the
robot always moves towards the optimal goal, ignoring hu-
man adaptability. We hypothesize that this will have a neg-
ative effect on human trust and perceived robot performance
as a teammate. On the other extreme, we have the robot
assist the human in achieving their desired goal.
We show that the proposed formalism achieves a trade-
off between the two: when the human is non-adaptable, the
robot follows the human preference. Otherwise, the robot
insists on the optimal way of completing the task, leading
to significantly better policies, compared to following the
human preference, while achieving a high level of trust.
6.1 Independent Variables
No-adaptation session. The robot executes a fixed policy,
always acting towards the optimal goal.
Mutual-adaptation session. The robot executes the MOMDP
policy of Sec. 5.3.
One-way adaptation session. The robot estimates a dis-
tribution over user goals, and adapts to the user following
their preference, assisting them for that distribution [9]. We
compute the robot policy in that condition by fixing the
adaptability value to 0 in our model and assigning equal re-
ward to both goals.
6.2 Hypotheses
H1 The performance of teams in the No-adaptation condi-
tion will be better than of teams in the Mutual-adaptation
condition, which will in turn be better than of teams in the
One-way adaptation condition. We expected teams in the
No-adaptation condition to outperform the teams in the
other conditions, since the robot will always go to the opti-
mal goal. In the Mutual-adaptation condition, we expected
a significant number of users to adapt to the robot and
switch their strategy towards the optimal goal. Therefore,
we posited that this would result in an overall higher reward,
compared to the reward resulting from the robot following
the participants’ preference throughout the task (One-way
adaptation).
H2 Participants that work with the robot in the One-way
adaptation condition will rate higher their trust in the robot,
as well as their perceived collaboration with the robot, com-
pared to working with the robot in the Mutual-adaptation
condition,. Additionally, participants in the Mutual-adaptation
condition will give higher ratings, compared to working with
the robot in the No-adaptation condition. We expected users
to trust the robot more in the One-way adaptation con-
dition than in the other conditions, since in that condi-
tion the robot will always follow their preference. In the
Mutual-adaptation condition, we expected users to trust the
robot more and perceive it as a better teammate, compared
with the robot that executed a fixed strategy ignoring users’
adaptability (No-adaptation). Previous work in collabora-
tive tasks has shown a significant improvement in human
trust, when the robot had the ability to adapt to the human
parter [15,24,25]
6.3 Experiment Setting: A Table Clearing Task
Participants were asked to clear a table off two bottles
placed symmetrically, by providing inputs to a robotic arm
through a joystick interface (Fig. 1). They controlled the
robot in Cartesian space by moving it in three different di-
rections: left, forward and right. We first instructed them in
the task, and asked them to do two training sessions, where
they practiced controlling the robot with the joystick. We
then asked them to choose which of the two bottles they
would like the robot to grab first, and we set the robot pol-
icy, so that the other bottle was the optimal goal. This
emulates a scenario where, for instance, the robot would be
unable to grasp one bottle without dropping the other, or
where one bottle would be heavier than the other and should
be placed in the bin first. In the one-way and mutual adap-
tation conditions, we told them that “the robot has a mind
of its own, and it may choose not to follow your inputs.” Par-
ticipants then did the task three times in all conditions, and
then answered a post-experimental questionnaire that used
a five-point Likert scale to assess their responses to working
with the robot. Additionally, in a video-taped interview at
the end of the task, we asked participants that had changed
strategy during the task to justify their action.
6.4 Subject Allocation
We recruited 51 participants from the local community,
and chose a between-subjects design in order to not bias the
users with policies from previous conditions.
6.5 MOMDP Model
The size of the observable state-space X was 52 states.
We empirically found that a history length of k = 1 in
BAM was sufficient for this task, since most of the sub-
jects that changed their preference did so reacting to the
previous robot action. The human and robot actions were
{move-left, move-right, move-forward}. We specified two
stochastic modal policies {mL,mR}, one for each goal. We
additionally assumed a discrete set of values of the adapt-
ability α : {0.0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0}. Therefore, the total size
of the MOMDP state-space was 5 × 2 × 52 = 520 states.
We selected the reward so that Ropt = 11 for the optimal
goal, Rsub = 10 for the suboptimal goal, and C = −0.32
for the cost of mode disagreement (Eq. 8). We computed
the robot policy using the SARSOP solver [26], a point-
based approximation algorithm which, combined with the
MOMDP formulation, can scale up to hundreds of thou-
sands of states [17].
7. ANALYSIS
7.1 Objective Measures
We consider hypothesis H1, that the performance of teams
in the No-adaptation condition will be better than of teams
in the Mutual-adaptation condition, which in turn will be
better than of teams in the One-way adaptation condition.
Nine participants out of 16 (56%) in the Mutual-adaptation
condition guided the robot towards the optimal goal, which
was different than their initial preference, during the final
trial of the task, while 12 out of 16 (75%) did so at one or
more of the three trials. From the participants that changed
their preference, only one stated that they did so for reasons
irrelevant to the robot policy. On the other hand, only two
participants out of 17 in the One-way adaptation condition
changed goals during the task, while 15 out of 17 guided the
robot towards their preferred, suboptimal goal in all trials.
This indicates that the adaptation observed in the Mutual-
adaptation condition was caused by the robot behavior.
We evaluate team performance by computing the mean
reward over the three trials, with the reward for each trial
being Ropt if the robot reached the optimal goal and Rsub
if the robot reached the suboptimal goal (Fig. 6-left). As
expected, a Kruskal-Wallis H test showed that there was
a statistically significant difference in performance among
the different conditions (χ2(2) = 39.84, p < 0.001). Pair-
wise two-tailed Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon tests with Bonfer-
roni corrections showed the difference to be statistically sig-
nificant between the No-adaptation and Mutual-adaptation
(U = 28.5, p < 0.001), and Mutual-adaptation and One-way
adaptation (U = 49.5, p = 0.001) conditions. This supports
our hypothesis.
7.2 Subjective Measures
Recall hypothesis H2, that participants in the Mutual-
adaptation condition would rate their trust and perceived
collaboration with the robot higher than in the No-adaptation
condition, but lower than in the One-way adaptation condi-
tion. Table I shows the two subjective scales that we used.
The trust scales were used as-is from [27]. We additionally
chose a set of questions related to participants’ perceived
collaboration with the robot.
Both scales had good consistency. Scale items were com-
bined into a score. Fig. 6-center shows that both partici-
pants’ trust (M = 3.94, SE = 0.18) and perceived collab-
oration (M = 3.91, SE = 0.12) were high in the Mutual-
adaptation condition. One-way ANOVAs showed a statis-
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Figure 6: Findings for objective and subjective measures.
tically significant difference between the three conditions in
both trust (F (2, 48) = 8.370, p = 0.001) and perceived col-
laboration (F (2, 48) = 9.552, p < 0.001). Tukey post-hoc
tests revealed that participants of the Mutual-adaptation
condition trusted the robot more, compared to participants
that worked with the robot in the No-adaptation condition
(p = 0.010). Additionally, they rated higher their perceived
collaboration with the robot (p = 0.017). However, there
was no significant difference in either measure between par-
ticipants in the One-way adaptation and Mutual-adaptation
conditions. We attribute these results to the fact that the
MOMDP formulation allowed the robot to reason over its es-
timate of the adaptability of its teammate; if the teammate
insisted towards the suboptimal goal, the robot responded
to the input commands and followed the user’s preference. If
the participant changed their inputs based on the robot ac-
tions, the robot guided them towards the optimal goal, while
retaining a high level of trust. By contrast, the robot in the
No-adaptation condition always moved towards the optimal
goal ignoring participants’ inputs, which in turn had a neg-
ative effect on subjective measures.
8. DISCUSSION
In this work, we proposed a human-robot mutual adapta-
tion formalism in a shared autonomy setting. In a human
subject experiment, we compared the policy computed with
our formalism, with an assistance policy, where the robot
helped participants to achieve their intended goal, and with
a fixed policy where the robot always went towards the op-
timal goal.
As Fig. 6 illustrates, participants in the one-way adapta-
tion condition had the worst performance, since they guided
the robot towards a suboptimal goal. The fixed policy achieved
maximum performance, as expected. However, this came to
the detriment of human trust in the robot. On the other
hand, the assistance policy in the One-way adaptation con-
dition resulted in the highest trust ratings — albeit not sig-
nificantly higher than the ratings in the Mutual-adaptation
condition — since the robot always followed the user prefer-
ence and there was no goal disagreement between human and
robot. Mutual-adaptation balanced the trade-off between
optimizing performance and retaining trust: users in that
condition trusted the robot more than in the No-adaptation
condition, and performed better than in the One-way adap-
tation condition.
Fig. 6-right shows the three conditions with respect to
trust and performance scores. We can make the MOMDP
policy identical to either of the two policies in the end-points,
by changing the MOMDP model parameters. If we fix in the
Table I: Subjective Measures
Trust α = .85
1.I trusted the robot to do the right thing at the right
time.
2.The robot was trustworthy.
Perceived Collaboration α = .81
1.I was satisfied with ADA and my performance.
2.The robot and I worked towards mutually agreed
upon goals.
3.The robot and I collaborated well together
4.The robot’s actions were reasonable.
5.The robot was responsive to me.
model the human adaptability to 0 and assign equal costs
for both goals, the robot would assist the user in their goal
(One-way adaptation). If we fix adaptability to 1 in the
model (or we remove the penalty for mode disagreement),
the robot will always go to the optimal goal (fixed policy).
The presented table-clearing task can be generalized with-
out significant modifications to tasks with a large number of
goals, human inputs and robot actions, such as picking good
grasps in manipulation tasks (Fig. 2): The state-space size
increases linearly with (1/dt), where dt a discrete time-step,
and with the number of modal policies. On the other hand,
the number of observable states is polynomial to the number
of robot actions (O(Akr )), since each state includes history
hk: For tasks with large |Ar| and memory length k, we could
approximate hk using feature-based representations.
Overall, we are excited to have brought about a better un-
derstanding of the relationships between adaptability, per-
formance and trust in a shared autonomy setting. We are
very interested in exploring applications of these ideas be-
yond assistive robotic arms, to powered wheelchairs, remote
manipulators, and generally to settings where human inputs
are combined with robot autonomy.
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